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FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR CALCULATING




The development of more accurate methodologies for calculating
reasonable royalties in patent litigation has been the focus of intense
interest in patent reform circles over the past decade. This article
argues that a rational system for awarding reasonable royalties for
patent infringement would be premised on four related principles: (1)
that in awarding retrospective damages (damages for past acts of
infringement) courts should take the scope of substantive patent law
as fixed; (2) that the baseline damages recovery for prevailing patent
owners should be the amount that restores them to the position they
would have enjoyed, but for the infringement; (3) that courts should
depart from this baseline when doing so is necessary to attain optimal
deterrence; and (4) that, in attempting to replicate the license the
parties would have negotiated ex ante but for the infringement,
subject to some exceptions courts should authorize the consideration
of factors that the parties realistically would have used, and should
exclude consideration of certain other factors that lack a sound basis.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, juries in some patent infringement suits have
awarded prevailing patentees "reasonable royalty" damages in the
eight-, nine-, and even ten-figure ranges.' Though not all of these
t Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
Stanford Law School for selecting this paper as one of the winners of the Samsung-Stanford
Patent Prize, for which I presented this paper at the Inaugural Samsung-Stanford Conference on
Patent Remedies held at Stanford Law School on February 18, 2011. In the interest of full
disclosure, I should note that I served as a consultant to Samsung Electronics earlier in 2010,
and that I also presented this paper at a conference held on January 21, 2011, by the Santa Clara
Computer and High Technology Law Journal that was sponsored in part by Samsung. The
conclusions stated herein, however, as well as any errors or omissions, are mine. I also thank
Sanjiv Laud for excellent research assistance.
1. One commentator lists nine patent infringement cases decided since February 2007 in
which jury verdicts amounted to $100 million or more. See Christopher B. Seaman,
Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010
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awards have been upheld following post-judgment motions or on
appeal,2 concern over the magnitude and frequency of such large
damages awards has led to calls for the reform of various practices
relating to the calculation of patent damages. Other voices, not
surprisingly, have either defended the current system or, at the very
least, expressed reservations over the need for significant changes.4
Underlying some of these debates are fundamental differences of
opinion concerning the risks of so-called "patent holdup" resulting
from the discovery, ex post, that a firm has infringed (often
inadvertently) a patent reading on one of perhaps thousands of
BYU L. REV. 1661, 1663-65 (2011), available at
http:lwww.1awreview.byu.edu/archives/20 l0/5/05Seaman.pdf. Two of these-Lucent
Technologies., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912 (S.D. Cal. 2007), aff'd on other
grounds, 543 F.3d 710 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No.
2010-1144, 2011 WL 635291 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23. 2011), see also Verdict Form, Centocor Ortho
Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 2:07-CV-139 (E.D. Tex. June 29, 2009), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/centocor-abbott verdictform.pdf-involved awards of over $1
billion, although the award in Lucent did not survive a post-trial motion, see Lucent, 509 F.
Supp. 2d at 93541, and the judgment in Centocor was just recently reversed on written
description grounds without addressing the damages issues, see Centocor, 2011 WL 635291, at
* 1, *9. Three of the other awards similarly were either vacated or reduced. See Seaman, supra,
at 1664 nn.6-7, 1665 n.12. For other relevant studies, see Paul M. Janicke, Patent Damages,
FTC.GOV (Feb. 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/febll /docs/pjanicke.pdf
(reporting that, since January 1, 2005, median district court awards in cases in which patentees
prevail have averaged $5-6 million); Aron Levko, 2009 Patent Damages Study: Preliminary
Results, FTC.GOV (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/febl l/docs/alevko.pdf (reporting "fairly
consistent" median patent damages awards in federal district court since 1995, but that in some
years median jury awards, which tend to be higher than median awards in bench trials, have
exceeded $10 million in 2008 dollars); J. Shawn McGrath & Kathleen M. Kedrowski, Damages
Trends in Patent and Lanham Act Cases, AMERICANBAR.ORG (2010),
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/corporate/docs/2010-cle-materials/05-hot-topics-
ip-remedies-injunctions/05b-damages-trends-ga-bar.pdf (reporting average and median patent
damages awards increasing over time, to $17.8 million and $2.8 million, respectively, from
2000-08). Janicke's updated calculation reports median awards over the relevant time period, in
cases in which patentees prevail on at least one patent claim, in the range of $6-7 million. See
US. Patent Litigation Statistics, PATSTATS.ORG, http://www.patstats.org/Patstats3.html (last
visited Nov. 30, 2010). For discussion of a more recent very large damages award, see Susan
Decker & Dennis Robertson, J & J Told to Pay Doctor $482 Million In Patent Verdict,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 28, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-28/j-j-told-to-pay-new-
jersey-doctor-482-million-in-patent-infringement-case.html (discussing a recent jury verdict
from the Eastern District of Texas).
2. See Seaman, supra note 1, at 1664 nn.6-7, 1665 n.12.
3. I review some of the relevant literature, and related proposals to amend the Patent
Act, in Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J.
CORP. L. 1151, 1182-87 (2009). For discussion of some other proposals and counterproposals,
see infra Parts II & III.
4. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1182-87.
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components embodied in a complex end product.s Moreover, ever
since the Supreme Court's decision in eBay Inc. et al. v.
MercExchange, L.L. C. 6 freed district courts from the requirement of
automatically awarding injunctions to prevailing patent owners,
damages law has taken on a new twist as courts have struggled to
define the proper methodology for calculating royalties not only for
past infringement but, in some instances, for the prospective, post-
judgment use of a patented invention.7
In this article, I will argue that a rational system for awarding
reasonable royalties for patent infringement would be premised on
four related principles:
(1) in awarding retrospective damages (damages for past acts of
infringement), courts should take the scope of substantive patent law
as fixed;
(2) the baseline damages recovery for prevailing patent owners
should be the amount that restores them to the position they would
have enjoyed but for the infringement;
(3) courts should depart from this baseline when doing so is
necessary to attain optimal deterrence; and
(4) in attempting to replicate the license the parties would have
negotiated ex ante but for the infringement, subject to some
exceptions courts should authorize the consideration of factors that
the parties realistically would have used, and should exclude
consideration of factors that lack a sound theoretical or empirical
basis.
Part I provides a brief overview of the law of reasonable
royalties and some of the current controversies surrounding this body
of law. Part II elaborates on the four principles set forth above. Part
III concludes.
I. CURRENT LAW AND ITS CRITICS
Section 284 of the U.S. Patent Act provides in relevant part:
"[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
infringer."8 Section 284 therefore authorizes a court to award the
5. See id. at 1160-87.
6. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F. 3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Paice
LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630-31 (E.D. Tex. 2009).
8. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
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prevailing patentee its lost profit, if any, attributable to the
infringement or, in the alternative, a reasonable royalty.9
Conceptually, an award of lost profits would be appropriate in cases
in which the patentee and the infringer compete in the same market
and, but for the infringement, the patentee would have excluded the
infringer from using the patented invention (rather than licensing its
use).i0 When the patentee does not or cannot prove any lost profits,
however, an award of reasonable royalties is said to serve as a "floor"
or minimum compensation for the defendant's unauthorized use." In
awarding reasonable royalties, courts often recite (and instruct the
jury on) the so-called Georgia-Pacific factors, a list of fifteen
considerations that (at times) have been thought to be relevant to this
determination.12 Courts and commentators sometimes cite the
9. Damages may take the form of an established royalty, if there is evidence of one. See
ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 211 (2005). Awards of reasonable royalties appear to be
much more common, however. See id. at 211-12.
10. See id. at 49-59, 212; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Remedies and Practical
Reason, 88 TEX. L. REv. 125, 130-31, 134 & n.58 (2010) (stating and citing other sources in
support of the proposition in the text above). Logically, if the patentee does not compete with
the defendant, the infringement cannot deprive the patentee of any sales or, a fortiori, any
profits. Moreover, even if the parties do compete, the patentee suffers no loss of profits if, in the
absence of infringement, the patentee would have not excluded the defendant-for example,
because the patentee would have licensed to the defendant, or because the defendant would have
used a substitute technology that would have enabled the defendant to sell the same volume of
products at the same price. If, on the other hand, the defendant would have made some, but
fewer, sales using the substitute technology, the patentee is entitled to a lost profit award that
reflects the difference between the profit it actually made and the profit it would have made but
for the infringement. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 214-15, 220-22. Finally, if the
patentee would have excluded the defendant in preference to an exclusive licensee, the
patentee's loss is equal to the forgone licensing revenue it would have earned from that licensee;
the exclusive licensee's loss is equal to its own lost profit. See Cotter, supra, at 135; see also
Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 655, 673 & n.82 (2009) (recommending that "a patentee who has granted an exclusive
license should stand in the shoes of the exclusive licensee; if the exclusive licensee has lost
profits because of infringement, those losses should be compensable in a suit by either or both
parties, divided as per the agreement between them," while recognizing that "[t]he Federal
Circuit has treated the two differently for purposes of awarding both lost profits and injunctive
relief') (citing Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and Voda v.
CoTdis, Inc., 536 F.3d 13 1 1, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
11. See, e.g., Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(stating that a reasonable royalty is "merely the floor below which damages shall not fall").
12. The factors are:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
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fifteenth factor, the "amount that a licensor . .. and a licensee ...
would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement" as
the overarching consideration, and the other factors as evidence that
may be helpful in establishing this amount,13 though it is not clear
that this view has been universally accepted.
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or
whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products
of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of
sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed
sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business
risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the
amount which a prudent licensee-who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able
to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a
prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.
Georgia-Pacific Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
13. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324-35 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (considering the Georgia-Pacific factors in light of this overarching framework); Daralyn
J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 643 (2010) (arguing that Georgia-Pacific factor 15 "represents
the ultimate question all of the other factors are trying to establish").
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Critics have noted many potential pitfalls in the application of
the Georgia-Pacific factors, as well as with various other standards
that sometimes bear on the calculation of reasonable royalties. First, is
the malleability of the Georgia-Pacific standards themselves. Even if
(as some of the commentators interpret the case) the overarching
purpose of the factors is to enable a court to estimate the amount to
which the willing licensor and licensee would have agreed ex ante, as
many of these same commentators recognize, the individual factors
are often sufficiently vague as to provide almost limitless discretion to
the trier of fact. 14 Second, critics charge that, in applying Georgia-
Pacific factor two (comparable licenses), courts sometimes have
permitted the trier of fact to consider licenses that are not
economically comparable at all-for example, licenses involving
large portfolios of patents, or using different calculation
methodologies.' 5 Third, notwithstanding factor fifteen's reference to
the amount "a prudent licensee ... would have been willing to pay as
a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit," the Federal
Circuit has held more than once that royalty awards not only may
exceed the amount the parties would have agreed to, but may even
exceed the defendant's entire expected profit from the use of the
patent.' 6 Fourth, until (very) recently, courts continued to accept
expert testimony based on so-called "rules of thumb"-for example,
that licensees typically pay 25% of the profits derived from licensed
patents -in the face of criticism that such "rules" have no empirical
basis.' 8 Fifth, courts on occasion have applied the "entire market
value rule," a technique derived from the law of lost profits, to the
calculation of reasonable royalties.' 9 In practice, this means that
14. See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 13, at 632 ("With at least fifteen factors, a
complex interaction between them, and little limit on expert testimony on damages, there is
likely to be evidence somewhere in the case that could be construed to support virtually any
number the jury might settle on.").
15. See Brief for Ten Amici Curai Technology-Based Companies in Support of Appellant
Microsoft Corp., 22, Lucent Technologies., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Nos. 2008-1485, -1486, -1487, -1495), 2008 WL 5550592.
16. See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
amended by 557 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
17. See i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
18. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bailey et al., Groundhog Day: Recurring Themes on
Reasonable Royalties in Recent IP Damage Cases, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, 6 (Dec. 7,
2009) http://www.nera.com/exthnage/PUB IPGroundhog Day_1209.pdf (arguing that "[t]he
25% rule makes no economic sense"); see also infra Part II.E.
19. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 660-63.
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where the patent is the basis for the demand for the end product, the
court may use the entire revenue from sales of the end product as the
royalty base.20 In theory, the entire market value rule need not lead to
substantial royalty awards, even if (as is sometimes the case) the
entire market value is enormous, as long as the applicable royalty rate
is correspondingly small. 21 Critics charge, however, that the use of
the entire market value rule in the calculation of royalties grossly
inflates royalty awards beyond what any rational licensee would have
agreed to. 22
Some recent case law has begun to move away from some of the
positions that have attracted the attention of critics. In Lucent Techs.,
Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,2 3 for example, the plaintiff sued Microsoft and
other firms for contributing to and inducing the infringement of a
patent relating to the "date picker" function found in products such as
Microsoft Outlook. 24 A jury found for the plaintiff and awarded $350
million in lump-sum royalties, which, on the basis of the entire
market value rule, equaled 8% of the sales revenue from Microsoft
Office during the relevant time period. 25 The Federal Circuit affirmed
as to liability but reversed the damages judgment, concluding that the
evidence did not support the inference that the date-picker function
was a substantial driver of Microsoft Office sales.26 Considering some
of the Georgia-Pacific factors, the court also concluded that Lucent's
proffered evidence of other licenses was not comparable for a variety
of reasons; 27 that the patented feature was "but a tiny feature of one
part of a much larger software program" and thus did not constitute a
substantial portion of the value of Outlook;2 8 and that the other
factors were either lacking in evidence or inconclusive.29 The court
reaffirmed that the entire market value rule requires proof that the
20. See, e.g., Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 286 (N.D.N.Y.
2009) (Rader, J., sitting by designation) (stating that the critical requirement for using the entire
market value of the accused products as the royalty base is a connection between the patented
invention and the unpatented components that the patentee seeks to include in the royalty base).
21. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1186.
22. See id. at ll86 n.166.
23. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
24. See id. at 1317.
25. See id. at 1323-24, 1336.
26. See id. at 1337-38, 1340.
27. See id. at 1325-32 (concluding that the other lump-sum licenses were not comparable,
because one was for a large portfolio and others were for PC-related technology; and that the
running royalty licenses were not comparable because they were not lump-sum).
28. Id. at 1332-33.
29. See id. at 1333-36.
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feature at issue is the basis for customer demand,30 while also
suggesting that under other circumstances the choice of royalty base
may not matter much as long as the royalty rate is appropriate.
Finally, however, the court rejected Microsoft's suggestion that the
district judge had abandoned her "gatekeeper" role, and noted that
Microsoft had not objected to Lucent's introduction of supposed
comparable licenses.32
Although the Lucent decision went farther than any previous
Federal Circuit opinion in responding positively to some of the
critical commentary on royalties as noted above, the decision still left
several questions open, including the continued vitality of Federal
Circuit precedent permitting royalties to exceed the defendant's
expected profit and to be based on "rules of thumb." Indeed, in its
subsequent decision in i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp.3 3 the
court found no abuse of discretion in a district court's admission of
expert testimony on damages based in part on the application of a
25% rule of thumb-a rule which, notwithstanding substantial
academic criticism of its use, "assumes the inventor will keep 25% of
the profits from any infringing sales." 34 Similarly, in Fresenius USA,
Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc.35 the court approved of the use of a royalty
base that included not only the value of the infringing machines but
also of certain unpatented disposable parts.
More recently still, however, the pendulum appears to have
swung back in favor of the more economically rational approach
reflected in Lucent. In both ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 37 and
Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc.38 for
example, the court reversed a damages judgment based on speculative
30. See id. at 1336.
31. See id. at 1338-39 (stating that "the base used in a running royalty calculation can
always be the value of the entire commercial embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the rate
is within an acceptable range (as determined by the evidence)," and that "Microsoft surely
would have little reason to complain about the supposed application of the entire market value
rule had the jury applied a royalty rate of .1% (instead of 8%) to the market price of the
infringing programs.").
32. See id. at 1325.
33. i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).
34. See id. at 853-55. 1 discuss the economic critiques of the rule infra Part IlI.D.5.
35. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
36. See id. at 1303.
37. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
38. Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed.
Cir. 2010).
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expert testimony.39 More recently still, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp.,40  the Federal Circuit embraced economists'
criticisms of the 25% rule of thumb as an arbitrary starting point for
calculating royalties.4 1 Characterizing the rule as "a fundamentally
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical
negotiation," the court held that "[e]vidence relying on the 25% rule
of thumb is thus inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts
of the case at issue." 4 2 In addition, the court qualified the Lucent
court's suggestion, in the context of its discussion of the entire market
value rule, that use of a large royalty base may not matter much if the
corresponding royalty rate is appropriately small.43 First, the court
noted that the relevant statement in Lucent followed an extended
discussion of, and reiteration of the principle that, the entire market
value rule is appropriate only in a case in which the patented
invention is the basis for consumer demand for the entire product. 44
Second, the court observed:
This case provides a good example of the danger of admitting
consideration of the entire market value of the accused where the
patented component does not create the basis for customer
demand. As the district court aptly noted, "[t]he $19 billion cat was
never put back into the bag even by Microsoft's cross-examination
39. See ResQNet.com, 594 F.3d at 868-73; Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1320-22. In some other
cases pre-dating Lucent, the court also had expressed the view that the hypothetical negotiations
should take into account "real life" factors such as a licensor's unwillingness to negotiate. See,
e.g., Mitutoyo Corp v. Central Purchasing, LLC., 499 F.3d 1284, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating
that 29.2% royalty rate was "reasonable given the contentious history between these two
parties").
40. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
41. Id. at 1313-15.
42. Id at 1315. The court distinguished i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d
831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and another recent Federal circuit opinion, Finjan, Inc. v. Secure
Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2010), in which the court had upheld damages
awards based in part on the rule of thumb, characterizing i4i as a case in which the court had
"passively tolerated" use of the rule "where its acceptability has not been the focus of the case,"
Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1314, and Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1211, as one in which the parties disagreed
not on the use of the rule but rather on whether the correct percentage should have been 25% or
33%. See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1314-15. In Finjan, the court also detailed at great length the
evidence supporting the plaintiffs expert's methodology. See Finjan, 626 F.3d at 1203-1206.
43. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. In Uniloc, Microsoft had objected to the
plaintiffs expert's use of the entire market value of Office and Windows as a "check" on the
reasonableness of the royalty he had calculated using the 25% rule. See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at
1318-19.
44. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1320 (stating further that "The Supreme Court and this court's
precedents do not allow consideration of the entire market value of accused products for minor
patent improvements simply by asserting a low enough royalty rate." (citations omitted)).
HeinOnline  -- 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 733 2010-2011
734 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
of [plaintiffs expert] Mr. Gemini and re-direct of [defendant's
expert] Mr. Napper, and in spite of a final instruction that the jury
may not award damages based on Microsoft's entire revenue from
all the accused products in the case." This is unsurprising. The
disclosure that a company has made $19 billion dollars in revenue
from an infringing product cannot help but skew the damages
horizon for the jury, regardless of the contribution of the patented
45
component to this revenue.
Finally, the court stated that Uniloc exacerbated the risk of misuse of
the entire market value rule by calling to the jury's attention, during
cross-examination of Microsoft's damages expert, the fact that
Microsoft's proposed damages calculation amounted to just .000035
percent of the entire market value of sales of Windows and Office
during the relevant time period, noting that Uniloc's "derision of
Microsoft's damages expert . .. may have inappropriately contributed
to the jury's rejection of his calculations."46 As a result, the court
affirmed the district court's decision granting a new trial on
damages.47
Whether cases such as Lucent and Uniloc will stem the calls for
legislative reform-and whether future Federal Circuit panels will
adhere to the economic logic of these decisions-nevertheless
remains to be seen. The following Part of this article attempts to place
these decisions within a comprehensive analytic framework for
calculating damages and suggests some remaining areas in need of
reform.
II. FOUR PRINCIPLES
In this Part, I elaborate upon the four principles referred to
above. In particular, I first defend the principle that courts should take
the substantive law as a given, for purposes of assessing damages for
past conduct. I then argue that this premise leads to the second
principle, that courts generally should strive to award damages (either
in the form of lost profits or reasonable royalties) that would restore
the status quo ante between the parties; in the context of reasonable
royalties, this involves the application of the willing licensor-willing
licensee framework. Third, I argue that courts should depart from the
status quo baseline only when necessary to attain optimal deterrence.
Fourth, I argue that in reconstructing the terms of the hypothetical
45. Id. (internal citations omitted).
46. Id. at 1321.
47. Id at 1323.
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license, courts should apply realistic measures of patent value by
(when possible) assessing the value of the patent in comparison with
the next-best alternative; taking into account the existence of other
patents reading on the end product; and considering comparable
licenses and realistic rates and bases. Courts nevertheless should
continue to exclude from consideration the ex ante probability of
infringement and invalidity and probably should eliminate the use of
the entire market value rule altogether. The court is to be
congratulated on its recent rejection of the 25% rule of thumb.
A. Taking the Substantive Law as a Given
In other work, I have argued that patent damages should be
ancillary to patent substance-that is, that courts should award patent
damages in such a way as to support, and not undermine, the tradeoffs
between access and incentives as embodied in the substantive law.
This principle does not in any way depend upon the illusion that
substantive patent law is ideal. Indeed, it would be remarkable if
substantive patent doctrine perfectly attained the maximum surplus of
social benefits over social costs. Reasonable minds may differ, for
example, on questions whether a twenty-year patent term is too long
or too short (or too "uniform"), whether the standards for evaluating
obviousness or enablement are too strict or too lenient, whether
continuation abuse needs to be reined in, and whether a host of other
reforms to the substantive or administrative law of patents would be
desirable.49 My points are simply that the law of damages must begin
from some set of premises and that, for both rule-of-law and
institutional competency considerations, taking the substantive law of
patents as a given makes more sense than the alternative of asking
courts to manipulate damages law to counter perceived defects in
substance. 5
48. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 5-6; Cotter, supra note 3, at 1159; Cotter,
supra note 10, at 130.
49. See generally, Cotter, supra note 10, at 130.
50. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 5-6; Cotter, supra note 3, at 1159; Cotter,
supra note 10, at 130. As a consequence, I have expressed disagreement with John Golden's
characterization as "draconian" the assumption that, for purposes of awarding patent remedies
one should assume that the rest of patent law remains fixed, see John M. Golden, Principles for
Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REv. 505, 527 (2010); and with his concern over the "disconnect
between a patentee's reward, the social value of the invention, and the fraction of realized social
value that the patentee appropriates," see id. at 544. See Cotter, supra note 10, at 129-30
(suggesting that a more pragmatic view of the patent system would alleviate the disappointment
over patent law's failure to attain such a Platonic ideal). For a contradictory view, see Ted
Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of "Private Law" Remedies (Feb. 18, 2011),
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As stated, this first principle may seem both obvious (or at least,
it has always so appeared to me) and modest-modest in the sense
that its principal implications relate to the calculation of monetary
damages, as discussed below, and not to the choice of monetary
damages over other possible remedies such as injunctive relief. Of
course, with respect to remedying past harms, there may be few if any
alternatives to monetary damages. With respect to prospective relief,
by contrast, the substantive law provides no clear answer as to
whether courts should generally opt for an ongoing damages remedy
or a permanent injunction; courts therefore may have no option but to
consider which remedy better serves public policy. 51 Principle One
and the three other related principles nevertheless will have
implications for the correct calculation of any such prospective
damages, as we shall see.52
B. Restoring the Status Quo Ante
The second principle, which follows from the first, is that at least
as a first approximation the law of patent damages should attempt
simply to restore the status quo ante-that is, to make the patentee
neither worse nor better off than it would have been, but for the
infringement. Two considerations underlie this principle. First, if
courts systematically awarded patent damages below the greater of
the patentee's lost profits or the royalties the patentee would have
earned but for the infringement, prospective users would be better off
infringing (ignoring, for the moment, the possibility of incurring
attorneys' fees and other related costs); and patent owners would
systematically be undercompensated, in comparison with a baseline
under which they are free to charge whatever the market will bear for
their technology. On the assumption, as embodied in Principle One,
that courts generally should not second-guess Congress's decision to
allow patentees to charge whatever the market will bear, as long as
their patents are valid and enforceable, a damages regime that makes
patentees worse off in the event of infringement would be
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/eventsmedia/Ted%20Sichelman%20-
%20Purging%2OPatent%20LawO/o200f/2OPrivate%2OLaw%2ORemedies.pdf (arguing that
restoration of the status quo may not be optimal patent policy).
51. See Cotter, supra note 10, at 131. Doctrinally, the standards for determining whether
to grant an injunction require consideration of the public interest. See eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
52. See infra Parts I.B, II.D.
53. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1176-77; see also BLAIR & COTER, supra note 9, at 58-
61.
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undesirable.5 4  Second, however, if courts systematically over
rewarded patentees in comparison with what patentees would have
earned from exploiting their patents in the absence of infringement,
they in effect would be increasing the returns on patentees'
investments in the inventive process beyond what the market for
patented technology otherwise would dictate. Though in theory this
may increase some patentees' incentives to invent, it also necessarily
raises the social costs of the patent system, including monopoly costs
(if any) and (perhaps more likely) the costs of investing in and
marketing follow-up improvements. In addition, inflated damages
awards may threaten to over deter would-be users from lawfully
designing around in ways that come close to, but do not, constitute
infringement; the possibility of obtaining such awards also could
encourage patentees to lie in wait and sue, rather than to negotiate in
good faith up front."
Applying Principle Two, in a case in which the patentee can
prove that the infringement caused it to lose sales, a court should
award the patentee its lost profits attributable to the infringement, and
not a reasonable royalty.56 As in other areas of tort law, principles of
proximate causation or public policy may dictate that some measures
of consequential harm should be non-remediable. For example, the
rule that patentees may recover for lost profits on sales of convoyed
goods only if those goods are functionally related to the patented
invention5 7  may be a reasonable accommodation between the
competing policies of preserving the patent incentive scheme and
preventing the patentee from putting competitors in related markets at
an undue competitive disadvantage.
In -a case in which the patentee cannot prove lost profits,
however, its expectation damages typically 59 will be the value of the
54. Of course, there may be some exceptions to this principle-for example, when
governments impose compulsory licenses at below-market rates for essential medicines. See
Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPs Agreement, 22 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 307 (2004).
55. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1177, 1179.
56. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 235-42; Cotter, supra note 10, at 130.
57. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
58. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 254-62.
59. 1 say "typically" because one can imagine other instances in which licensing would
not have occurred: for example, a case in which the patentee preferred not to "work" the patent
at all, or would have licensed someone else to the exclusion of the defendant. In such a case, the
proper measure of expectation damages would be, in the first instance, the profit or licensing
revenue the patentee would have earned absent the defendant's competition with the patentee's
other, favored, technology (assuming, as is usually the case under U.S. law, that such
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license that the patentee would have negotiated with the defendant,
absent the infringement: in the words of the Georgia-Pacific
standards, the "amount that a licensor ... and a licensee ... would
have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had
been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement., 6 0
Estimating the negotiated royalty as of the date the infringement
began, in preference to other possible alternatives (for example, a
later date such as the date on which judgment is entered, or at the
other extreme some point preceding the date on which infringement
began) demands some explanation. Estimating the royalty based on a
later date, such as the date on which judgment is entered, might be
administratively easier in some respects. It might be simpler, for
example, to determine the value of the patent in light of the next-best
alternative as of the date of trial rather than as of some date several
years earlier when the infringement began. Using the date of
judgment as the baseline period from which to estimate the
hypothetical royalty nevertheless would be inadvisable, because doing
so would exacerbate the effects, if any, of technological lock-in or
patent holdup. Switching from one technology to another, in other
words, inevitably entails some switching costs, which are likely to be
greater as of the date of trial than they would have been on a date
preceding infringement when other, complementary investments in
the products at issue had yet to be made. Allowing the royalty to be
based in part on these switching costs, which are not a function of the
invention's contribution to the art,6 1 would threaten to make the
patentee better off than it would have been, but for the infringement,
and thus to violate Principles One and Two.62 A fortiori, Principle
technology suppression by the patentee is itself lawful). See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at
248. In the second instance, the measure of damages would be the forgone licensing revenue the
patentee would have earned from its desired licensing arrangement. If the infringement
precluded the patentee from entering into the desired arrangement, the correct measure of
damages logically would appear to be the royalty for which the patentee would have bargained
with the desired licensee. See Cotter, supra note 10, at 135. Yet another possibility is that the
patentee suffered lost profits but cannot prove the amount to the satisfaction of the trier of fact.
In such a case, an award of reasonable royalties is, in effect, a substitute for lost profits rather
than an estimate of what the parties would have agreed to ex ante. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra
note 9, at 231-32; Cotter, supra note 3, at 1187-89 n.178; Lemley, supra note 10, at 656.
60. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
61. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1184-85 n.158.
62. See id. As switching costs go to zero, the effects of using of a royalty calculated ex
ante as compared to a royalty calculated ex post are less clear. Ex post, the value of the
technology in comparison with the next best alternative might be higher or lower than it would
have appeared ex ante. A rule that consistently uses one time period, however, rather than one
that varies depending on which is higher ex post, may be more likely to encourage ex ante
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Two would provide no justification for awarding the patentee a larger
royalty than the defendant would have agreed to ex ante (absent the
need for a damages enhancement, as discussed in Part II.C below),
notwithstanding the Federal Circuit's approval of such awards in a
few cases.63
The same reasoning suggests that, if there is some class of cases
in which policy dictates that courts award prospective royalties in lieu
of a permanent injunction, they should use the same, ex ante, license
terms used in setting retrospective royalties. 4 I have argued before
that the principal reason not to award a permanent injunction is to
avoid the effects of lock-in driven patent holdup; a prospective
damages award that is based on ex post negotiations therefore
undermines the very reason for not awarding injunctive relief in the
first place.65 For analogous reasons, using a time frame that precedes
the date of infringement, such as was arguably embodied in the
proposed 2007 Patent Reform Act, 6 6 probably would be inadvisable
as well.67
negotiations.
63. See supra note 16.
64. See supra note 7.
65. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1181-82, 1187-88 n.172; see also Mark A. Lemley, The
Ongoing Confusion over Ongoing Royalties (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.law.stanford.eduldisplay/images/dynamic/events-media/Mark%20Lemley/ 20-
%20The%200ngoing%2OConfusion%200ver/o200ngoing%20Royalties.pdf (arguing in favor
of using the same royalty rate and base both pre- and post-verdict). Whether the conditions
counseling against permanent injunctions are common or rare is a matter in which I offer no
opinion at this time. Nor do I have a firm conviction at this point as to the strength of the
statutory and constitutional arguments against awards of prospective damages. See, e.g., H.
Tomis G6mez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu ofa Final Injunction in Patent and
Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 1671-72 (2010) (arguing that courts lack authority
in law or equity to award ongoing royalties); Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange: The Changing Landscape of Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J. L. Scl. & TECH. 543,
567-68 (2008) (arguing that courts lack statutory authority to impose ongoing royalties); Tim
Carlton, Note, The Ongoing Royalty: What Remedy Should a Patent Holder Receive When a
Permanent Injunction Is Denied?, 43 GA. L. REV. 543, 564-565 (2009) (arguing that courts
should not impose compulsory licenses at the reasonable royalty rate).
66. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1184-85. For a contrary view, see Amy L. Landers,
Theorizing "Patentee Injury": Apportioning Claims for Reasonable Royalty Compensation
(Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events media/Amy%20L.%20Landers%2
0-%20Theorizing%2OPatentee%201njury.pdf (arguing in favor of basing royalties on the
invention's contribution to the art as of the date of invention). Perhaps one could reconcile the
two views by arguing that royalties should reflect the value to the user, as of the date of
infringement, of the invention's contribution to the art, as of the date of invention-though
whether this nuance would be worth pursuing remains, in my view, unclear.
67. See John W. Schlicher, Patent Damages, the Patent Reform Act, and Better
Alternatives for the Courts and Congress, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 19, 38 (2009)
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C. Departures from the Baseline
The third principle is that, to the extent that an award of either
lost profits or (perhaps more especially) 68 forgone royalties threatens
to under deter infringement, courts should have the authority to award
enhanced damages or attorneys' fees where necessary to approximate
optimal deterrence.6 9  Providing courts with this option may be
necessary in some instances to channel would-be infringers into
negotiations with patent owners,7 o though the point probably should
(arguing that "[tihe technical differences between the patented invention and prior art that justify
granting the patent do not determine the value damages attempt to measure."). In conversation,
Schlicher has suggested to me that it might be theoretically sound to choose as the date of
hypothetical negotiations the date on which the infringer chose the technological path that
embraced the use of the patent at issue, insofar as this date (unlike, perhaps the date on which
the infringer actually began using the patent) would necessarily precede any form of lock-in. But
the use of this alternative date likely would be administratively more complex, and it would
require a significant modification of settled law.
68. "Perhaps more especially" because, in a case in which the patentee can prove lost
profits, economic analysis suggests that the patentee likely lost more than the infringer gained
from the infringement. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 58-59.
69. See id. at 61; Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages and
Attorney's Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291, 316 (2004). In cases in
which the defendant earned more from the infringement than the patentee would have eamed
from marketing patented articles itself, a restitutionary award would be another possible
alternative for creating additional deterrence (and thus channeling would-be users into
negotiations with patentees). See BLAIR & COTrER, supra note 9, at 61, 71-74. Indeed, in some
respects, a restitutionary award might seem superior to an award of reasonable royalties, to the
extent that determining the amount the defendant actually eamed from the infringement might
seem easier to calculate than the hypothetical amount the parties would have agreed to-itself a
function, in part, of the defendant's expected profit from the use of the patented invention,
measured as of the date of infringement. See id Restitutionary awards nevertheless present three
problems. First, if the correct amount of a restitutionary award is the amount the defendant
earned from the use of the patent in comparison with the amount if would have earned by using
the next-best available alternative, the calculation may not be any more tractable than the
calculation of the hypothetical license. See id. at 73. Second, restitutionary awards may pose
some risk of overdeterrence, particularly if the profit the defendant earned from the use of the
patented invention is not calculated as the surplus over and above what it have earned from the
next-best alternative, or is difficult to separate from the defendant's overall profits from the sale
of a product incorporating many patented inventions. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1176 n.128.
Third, for better or worse, U.S. patent law discarded restitutionary awards in 1946. See BLAIR &
COTTER, supra note 9, at 71-72.
70. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 61. The prospect of awarding enhanced
damages, where necessary, to achieve optimal deterrence, has a long pedigree in the law-and-
economics literature. See Cotter, supra note 69, at
310 n.75. Appropriately implemented, this policy tool would reduce the risk, cited by some
commentators, that awards based on the willing licensor-willing licensee framework will
encourage infringement. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the
Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92
MINN. L. REV. 714, 717, 736-43 (2007). Note, however, that Federal Circuit case law on
enhanced damages does not necessarily take this "optimal deterrence" perspective into adequate
account. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding
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not be overstated; the cost of defending a patent infringement suit,
after all, is substantial.n Moreover, empirical evidence indicates that
intentional infringement (deliberate copying) is relatively rare,
particularly in some high-tech industries; inadvertent infringement is
by far the norm.7 2 As noted above, then, contrary to some of the case
law courts should not award royalties that exceed the amount of the
defendant's expected profit from the use of the patented technology,
except to the extent (if any) that a damages enhancement is necessary
to attain optimal deterrence.74
D. Using Realistic Measures ofPatent Value
The last of the four principles is that, in awarding reasonable
royalties based on the estimated terms that the parties would have
agreed upon ex ante, the trier of fact should consider variables that
reflect the ex ante value of the technology and that would have
constrained real-world negotiations as a general rule. Such evidence
may include the expected value, in terms of contribution to
profitability or cost reduction, of the patented invention in comparison
with the next-best available alternative as of the date of infringement;
the existence and strength of other patented inventions possibly
incorporated into the relevant end product, as a possible constraint on
how much the defendant would have been willing to pay for the use
that an infringement is willful, and therefore possibly deserving of an award of enhanced
damages, if there was an "objectively high likelihood" that the patent was valid and infringed,
and the defendant either knew or should have known of this risk); Cotter, supra note 3, at 1179
n. 139 (stating that Seagate "nevertheless fails to grasp the fundamental economic rationale for
awarding enhanced damages, insofar as such awards continue to hinge upon ex ante
probabilities of infringement and validity, and not upon ex ante probabilities of detection"). See
also Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reversing the
addition of a royalty "kicker" as compensation for litigation and other expenses); Roger D. Blair
& Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 42 n.207
(2001) (citing other Federal Circuit case law that appears to conflict with Mahurkar on this
point).
71. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 231. On the cost of patent litigation, see
AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009 29 (reporting median litigation costs of
$650,000 to $5.5 million, depending on the amount at risk).
72. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L.
Rev. 1421 (2008). In theory, users can always search before infringing. See Roger D. Blair &
Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
799, 811-12 (2002). In reality, searches are often not feasible, particularly in IT, due to the
multiplicity of patents and the opacity of patent drafting techniques. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK 194-98 (2008).
73. See supra note 16.
74. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1186 n. 163.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 741 2010-2011
742 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 27
of the plaintiffs invention; the value of realistically comparable
licenses, if any; and the use of realistic royalty rates and bases for
calculating "running" royalties. Two real-world factors nevertheless
should not factor into the analysis, for reasons explained below.
Moreover, courts should eschew factors that lack solid empirical or
theoretical grounding as proxies for patent value.
1. Value of the Patented Invention in Comparison with the
Next-Best Alternative
From a purely economic perspective, the value of a patent at any
given point in time is no more (and no less) than the present value of
the expected profit (or cost saving) attributable to the use of the
patented invention in comparison with the next-best available
alternative. 75 Thus, in a world of perfect and costless information, one
could simply compare the present value at time t of the user's
expected profit or cost saving from the manufacture, use, and sale of a
product incorporating the patented invention, with the present value at
time t of the user's expected profit or cost saving from the
manufacture, use, and sale of a product incorporating the next-best
alternative. The difference between the two would be the value of the
patent to that user, and it would represent the maximum a rational
user would be willing to pay for the use of the patented invention.
Seen in this light, patents have no inherent value; rather, their value is
solely relational inasmuch as it depends on what the patent enables
the user to do. As a means to an end, patents have value depending
upon what those ends are and how (if at all) they shift over time; the
value the market places on those ends; and the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of alternative ways of attaining those
ends.76
Realistically, of course, determining the difference between the
user's expected profits at time t with and without the use of the
patented invention is at best an imperfect undertaking. For one thing,
the user/infringement defendant may not have such finely-grained
profitability or cost projections as of time t. This is particularly likely
to be the case when the invention at issue relates to only one of a
large number of component parts of a larger device and when the
infringement is inadvertent-which is to say in many fairly
75. See id. at 1178 n.137. Presumably, the present value of the license as of the date of
infringement would take into account the license's term. Note that patents cannot lawfully be
licensed past their termination date. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
76. See Cotter, supra note 10, at 129-30.
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commonplace settings in the high-tech industries.77 For another,
depending on the nature of the invention, it might be difficult to
identify exactly what the next-best alternative was as of the date
infringement began due both to the passage of time between that date
and the date of judgment and to the possible synergistic effects of
choosing one alternative over another for other elements of product
design. Moreover, even if such an alternative is identified, one must
be careful not to fall into the trap of inferring that the value of the
patented invention is simply the difference between the patented
invention's contribution to expected profit or cost saving, in
comparison with the next-best alternative's contribution; rather, one
must also take into account the cost, if any, of licensing the use of the
next-best alternative.
Notwithstanding these practical difficulties, logic suggests that a
patent's expected contribution to profitability or cost reduction in
relation to the next-best alternative-its expected economic utility to
the user, if you will-should be a key determinant of the user's
reservation price for the use of the invention. Therefore, competent
evidence of the patent's relative economic utility (even if such
evidence is not particularly "granular") 79 should be highly relevant to
the royalty determination.80 By this same logic, a patent that offers no
77. See supra note 72.
78. To illustrate the point, suppose that use of the patented technology is expected to
reduce costs by $10,000, whereas a license to use the next-best alternative is expected to cost
$4,000 and to reduce costs by $6,000. The value of the patent to the user is not $4,000 ($10,000
minus $6,000), but rather $10,000 minus the net value of the next-best alternative ($6,000 minus
$4,000 = $2,000); in other words, the value to the user is $10,000 minus $2,000 = $8,000.
$8,000 is the maximum that a rational user would be willing to pay for the use of the patented
invention. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1183 n. 157. If the patented invention is no better than the
next-best alternative-in the preceding example, if it reduces expected costs by only $6,000-
the user should be willing to pay no more than $4,000 (that is, the cost of a license to use the
next-best alternative). Note, however, that according to this logic, if the next-best alternative is
no worse than the patented invention and is in the public domain (meaning here that the cost to
use it equals zero), the value to the user of a license to use the patented invention is zero. See
infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
79. In other words, it may be more of a rough-and-ready estimate that the patent is highly
advantageous in comparison with the next-best alternative, or only moderately valuable, or
something along those lines.
80. See Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 893 F. Supp. 1386,
1392-93 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation) (using the defendant's cost
savings from the use of the patented invention, in comparison with the next-best available
alternative, for purposes of estimating a reasonable royalty), revd mem. on other grounds, 108
F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1997); BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD & DENNIS P. O'REILLEY, DRAFTING PATENT
LICENSE AGREEMENTS § 10.00, at 110 (5th ed. 2004); Martin S. Landis, Pricing and Presenting
Licensed Technology, at § 21.03[C][3], in 2 DRAFTING LICENSING AGREEMENTS (Michael A.
Epstein & Frank L. Politano eds., 4th ed. 2010).
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advantages over the next-best alternative should command a royalty
no higher than what it would have cost the user to obtain a license to
that next-best alternative. 8 ' In a case in which that next-best
alternative was in the public domain, therefore, the appropriate
royalty would be zero.82 To be sure, where the user deliberately
chooses the patented technology over the public domain alternative, it
may be fair to infer that the user viewed the patented technology as
superior, and thus that some non-zero royalty is appropriate. When
there is reason to believe, however, that the patented invention offered
no advantages over the next-best public domain alternative, there
would not appear to be any good economic reason to award any
royalties; the fair market value of an economically worthless patent
license is still zero." How often such problems would arise in the real
world nevertheless remains to be seen; perhaps they are rare.
2. Other Patented Inventions Incorporated into the
Infringing End Product
Another potentially relevant factor is the existence and strength
of other patented inventions possibly incorporated into the relevant
end product as a possible constraint on how much the defendant
would have been willing to pay for the use of the plaintiff s invention.
In particular, it stands to reason that a prospective licensee would
negotiate the royalty for a specific patent with an eye toward avoiding
the risk of royalty stacking. 84 Thus, if the evidence in a given case
supports the proposition that, say, the number and strength of other
patents reading on the end product would have been a factor the
prospective licensee would have taken into account in deciding how
much it was willing to pay for the use of the patent at issue, it would
be appropriate for the trier of fact to give this factor substantial weight
in the calculation of a reasonable royalty.85
81. See supra note 78.
82. See id.
83. See Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 420, 475 (1988) (observing that
"[w]here no one is willing or able to pay anything for property, its fair market value is zero"),
aff'd, 902 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See also Nathaniel C. Love, Comment, Nominal
Reasonable Royalties for Patent Infringement, 75 U. CHi. L. REV. 1749, 1768 (2008) (noting,
inter alia, that "[a]wards of zero or nominal damages are entirely unremarkable elsewhere in the
law where there is no actual injury").
84. Royalty stacking is the aggregation of multiple royalties such that the aggregate
licensing fee threatens to exceed the value of the end product. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1169
& n.94.
85. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 13, at 641("The intensity of the patent thicket should
be taken into account in setting a reasonable royalty. A willing buyer might be willing to pay up
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Practical problems nevertheless may arise in attempting to
present evidence of such other patents to the trier of fact. Would
testimony about the existence of such other patents open the door for
the patentee to inquire into whether the defendant has entered into
licensing agreements for these other patents? Could the defendant be
compelled to answer such questions? Might the answer to such a
question elicit unwanted interest in the defendant's activities from the
owners of these or other patents, or risk an adverse determination
from the jury on the basis of improper character evidence? 86 One way
out of this dilemma would be for courts to permit an expert witness to
testify (where appropriate)87  concerning the amount the willing
to 3% for a technology that reduces its costs by 3%, but it surely isn't willing to pay 3% to each
of ten different patent owners claiming rights in the technology. As a result, courts should
consider the number of other successful, pending, and potential patent claims on a technology in
deciding how to allocate royalties for that technology."). See also BRUNSVOLD & O'REILLEY,
supra note 80, at § 10.01.D (discussing potential contractual solutions to reduce the risk of
royalty stacking). In a related vein, Doug Lichtman has argued that, as the number of patents
incorporated into an end product increases, the less value any single patent has. See Doug
Lichtman, Patent Holdouts in the Standard-Setting Process, IP CENTRAL ACAD. ADV. COUNCIL
BULL. 1. 3 (May 2006), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ip/bulletins/bulletinl.3patent.pdf.
Although I have expressed doubt whether this phenomenon by itself would render problems of
patent holdout moot, see Cotter, supra note 3, at 1170 n.96, Lichtman's insight that patent value
is a function of the number of patents makes sense insofar as the willing licensee would never
voluntarily agree to pay more for a portfolio of patents than it expects to earn from the sale of
relevant end products. In the limiting case in which the number of effective patents is infinite,
the value of any one patent is zero. See Lichtman, supra, at 3.
86. See FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (stating the general rule that "[elvidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion"); FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (stating that "[e]vidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith," but that it may "be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident"). The defendant presumably could ask for a limiting instruction, see FED. R. EVID.
105, but commentators have long perceived the limited usefulness of such instructions. See, e.g.,
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2nd Cir. 1932) (referring to a limiting instruction as
"the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers,
but anybody's else").
87. That is, assuming that the expert's opinion on this matter satisfies Rule 702 and the
Daubert trilogy. See FED. R. EviD. 702 (stating that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact at issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case"); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592, 597 (1993) (holding
that courts must play a role in ensuring that expert testimony is reliable and based on scientific
knowledge); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (expanding the general
Daubert "gatekeeping" obligation to all expert testimony, not just expert testimony relating to
"scientific" knowledge); Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-47 (1997) (affirming
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licensee would have paid, based in part on the expert's analysis of the
existence and strength of other patents potentially reading on the end
product, without permitting further inquiry at trial into the nature of
the supporting evidence concerning the other licenses. 8 (The
sufficiency of the supporting evidence could of course be tested
pursuant to a motion in limine). Perhaps other analysts will propose
yet other methods for according appropriate consideration to this type
of evidence.89
3. Comparable Licenses and License Terms
Although theory suggests that the terms of a patent license
should depend largely upon the patent's expected impact on the user's
profits or costs, experience suggests that parties negotiating patent
licenses may resort to various proxies for estimating patent value.
One such proxy is the value of comparable patent licenses.90 Another
is the use of "running" royalties, calculated by multiplying a royalty
rate by a royalty base such as ongoing sale revenue. 91 In particular,
the parties may prefer a running royalty to a lump-sum royalty if the
value of the patent is difficult to calculate ex ante; 9 2 if the patentee
exclusion of expert testimony on causation given the "analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered," and specifically referring to the district courts' gatekeeping function).
88. See FED. R. EVID. 703 (stating that "[t]he facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing," and that "[ilf of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted"); FED. R. EVID. R.
705 (stating that "[t]he expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons
therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise"). Although Rule 705 goes on to state that "[tihe expert may in any event be required
to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination," FED. R. EVID. 705, courts retain
the discretion to exclude or limit the admissibility of such evidence where its "probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury," FED. R. Evio. 403. See, e.g., United States v. A & S Council Oil Co., 947
F.2d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that "Rule 705 permits the cross-examiner to require
the expert to reveal otherwise-inadmissible underlying information before the jury, subject ...
to Fed. R. Evid. 403's prejudice/probative value balancing test") (citing United States v. Gillis,
773 F.2d 549, 553-554 (4th Cir.1985)).
89. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 13, at 641 n.62 (stating that, in a forthcoming work,
one of the authors will offer "some thoughts on the process by which courts might collect and
use this information").
90. See, e.g., BRUNSVOLD & O'REILLEY, supra note 80, at § 10.00 (discussing use of
comparable licenses in negotiations); MARK S. HOLMES, PATENT LICENSING: STRATEGY,
NEGOTIATION, AND FORMS § 4.13 (2010); RUSSELL L. PARR, ROYALTY RATES FOR LICENSING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 61-66 (2007); Landis, supra note 80, § 21.02[A].
91. See BLAIR & COTrER, supra note 9, at 190-96, 199-202.
92. See id. at 190-96.
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prefers to license on a nonexclusive basis; 93 or if the licensee prefers
to retain the option of reevaluating the technology's usefulness as
time goes on. 94 For purposes of crafting reasonable royalties ex post,
however, courts should be careful that the supposedly comparable
licenses, or the selected royalty rates and bases, are the types of
licenses, rates, and bases that the parties themselves realistically
would have considered ex ante.
The use of comparable licenses in particular can be tricky. In the
typical patent infringement action, only one or a small number of
patents are at issue. As a result, portfolio licenses incorporating
hundreds of patents are not likely to be comparable to a hypothetical
license for the use of a single or small number of patents,9 5 a point
which the Federal Circuit recognized in Lucent.96 Similarly, licenses
involving running royalties are not readily comparable to lump-sum
licenses because, as suggested above, running royalties typically
reflect greater uncertainty over patent value and/or different
perspectives on the most efficient method of exploiting the patent.9 7
Thus, where the patentee requests a judgment based on a lump-sum
royalty, other licenses involving running royalties may not be
sufficiently comparable. The Federal Circuit also recognized this
point as in Lucent.98 In the alternative, patent owners sometimes
proffer as evidence licenses to which other users have agreed in
settlement of litigation.99 As a proxy for expected patent value ex
93. See id. at 198-202 (explaining why, in the case of nonexclusive licensing, running
royalties may be more efficient than lump-sum royalties).
94. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2009). By contrast, a lump-sum royalty provides the patentee with an immediate payment in
full, obviates the need to monitor the licensee's use, and removes the risk to the patentee of
licensee underreporting. See id
95. See PARR, supra note 90, at 65; Brief for Ten Amici Curiae In Support of Appellant,
supra note 15, at 22.
96. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1328.
97. See supra Part II.D.
98. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1329-30 (concluding that "[t]his is not to say that a running-
royalty license agreement cannot be relevant to a lump-sum damages award, and vice versa,"
but that "[flor a jury to use a running-royalty agreement as a basis to award lump-sum damages .
. . some basis for comparison must exist in the evidence presented to the jury"). Accord
Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
99. See Danielle Williams & Leslie T. Grab, Contemporary Issues in Patent Royalty
Damages, in PATENT LITIGATION 2010, at 314-17 (PLI Intell. Prop. Course Handbook Series
No. 24179, 2010) (noting that, despite the courts' traditional reluctance to consider such
licenses, recently courts have begun considering them); Michael J. Chapman, Using Settlement
Licenses in Reasonable Royalty Determinations, 49 IDEA 313 (2009) (arguing in favor of their
use).
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ante, however, this type of license should be suspect too; a license
entered into ex post in settlement of litigation is likely to reflect,
among other things, avoided litigation and design-around costs.oo
Strictly speaking, then, for a license to be economically comparable it
should relate to the same patent or patents at issue (and not other
patents); it should cover uses or products that are the same as (or at
least analogous to) the uses or products at issue; and it should involve
the same type of structure (lump-sum or running royalty) that the
patentee is seeking to impose in litigation.
Similarly, the use of running royalties should reflect the types of
royalty rates and bases that the parties realistically would have chosen
ex ante. Much of the debate over this issue in recent years has
centered on the use (or misuse) of the "entire market value rule"
("EMVR") in the calculation of reasonable royalties. 01 Historically,
courts developed the entire market value rule as a guide for awarding
lost profits in a case in which the patent covered only some portion or
component of an end product.102 In such a case, conventional wisdom
was that the patentee was entitled to recover only the fraction of its
lost profit that was properly attributable to the unauthorized use of the
patent; to recover its entire lost profit from forgone sales, the patentee
would have to prove that the "entire market value" of the end product
was attributable to the patented component-or, to put it another way,
that the patented component was the basis for consumers' demand for
the end product. 10 3 Seen in this light, the entire market value rule has
never stood on a very solid economic footing.
Economic logic suggests that, in a case in which the defendant's
unauthorized use of the patented invention was both the but-for and
proximate cause of the patentee's loss of sales, the defendant should
be liable for whatever profit the patentee would have made on those
forgone sales; there is no good reason to award only some supposedly
allocable portion of those proven lost profits. 104 The intuition that lay
100. See WordTech, 609 F.3d at 1320-1321. On the other hand, such licenses might tend to
show that the technology was worth less than the patentee claims. See Durie & Lemley, supra
note 13, at 642-43.
101. Compare, e.g., Lemley, supra note 10, at 663-65 (arguing that applying the EMVR in
the context of reasonable royalty awards makes no logical sense, and leads to inflated awards);
see also Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60
STAN. L. REv. 263 (2007), with Michael A. Einhom, Patent Reform and Infringement Damages:
Some Economic Reasoning, PATENT Docs (Feb. 5, 2008),
http://www.patentdocs.org/2008/02/patent-reform-a.html (taking a more favorable view).
102. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337; BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 216.
103. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336-37; BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 216.
104. See BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 9, at 220-22.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 748 2010-2011
2011] FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR CALCULATING ROYALTIES 749
behind the entire market value rule nevertheless was not necessarily
entirely off-base. In a case in which the presence of the patented
component in the end product is meaningful only to some purchasers
of the end product, it is likely that the unauthorized use caused the
patentee to lose some sales, but that the defendant would have made
some sales too even absent the infringement. In such a case, therefore,
it would be correct to assume that the patentee should not recover lost
profits measured by the patentee's profit margin on infringing sales
made by the defendant; tos some sort of allocation or apportionment
would be necessary to avoid overcompensation. The correct economic
framework for awarding damages in such a case, however, involves
(1) calculating the number of sales the patentee lost to the infringer as
a consequence of the infringement, and awarding the patentee its
forgone profits on those sales; and (2) awarding the patentee a
reasonable royalty on sales the defendant made that did not deprive
the patentee of any sales. In practical terms, this means that one must
estimate the number of purchasers who bought the product from the
defendant as a consequence of the product's incorporation of the
patented feature, and who would have bought it from the patentee
absent the infringement. For these lost sales, the patentee is entitled to
recover its provable lost profit. For any other sales the defendant
made to consumers who wouldn't have bought the product from the
patentee even absent the infringement, the patentee should recover
only reasonable royalties; there are no lost profits on these sales.
Based on this analysis, I have long argued that, in the lost profits
context, courts should do away with both apportionment and the
entire market value rule, and simply award the patentee the lost
profits and lost royalties that it suffered as a but-for, proximate
consequence of the infringement.10 6 Federal Circuit case law over the
past twenty years or so has operated more or less consistently with
this recommendation, though without explicitly discarding either
apportionment or the entire market value rule.'o7
Although the courts' failure to expressly discard the rule has
arguably had little if any practical consequence in the lost profits
context in recent years, the rule has enjoyed something of a second
105. In some early cases, courts assumed that the every sale made by the defendant was a
sale lost by the patentee. See id. at 213. Even in a case in which the patent reads on an entire end
product, however-a situation that probably was more common in the nineteenth century than it
is today-the assumption that every sale made by the defendant was a sale lost by the patentee
was facile. See id.
106. See id at 220-22.
107. See id
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career in the reasonable royalties context due to some unfortunate
dictum in the Federal Circuit's opinion in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley
Co. 08 In particular, Rite-Hite suggested that when the elements of the
entire market value rule are in place, a court could use the entire
market value of end products incorporating the patented invention as
the royalty base.109 At present, the clearest articulation of the rule in
the reasonable royalty context comes from opinions by Federal
Circuit Judge Rader, sitting by designation as a district court judge in
a patent dispute between Cornell University and Hewlett-Packard.'" 0
According to Judge Rader, the "critical requirement" for using "the
entire market value of the accused products as the royalty base" is "a
connection between the patented invention and the unpatented
components that the patentee seeks to include in the royalty base.""'
More precisely:
The entire market value rule in the context of royalties requires
adequate proof of three conditions: (1) the infringing components
must be the basis for customer demand for the entire machine
including the parts beyond the claimed invention; (2) the
individual infringing and non-infringing components must be sold
together so that they constitute a functional unit or are parts of a
complete machine or single assembly of parts; and (3) the
individual infringing and non-infringing components must be
analogous to a single functioning unit. It is not enough that the
infringing and non-infringing parts are sold together for mere
business advantage. Notably, these requirements are additive, not
alternative ways to demonstrate eligibility for application of the
entire market value rule. 12
Applying the rule, Judge Rader reduced Cornell's damages award
from $184,044,408 to $53,494,282, based on his conclusion that the
"record contains no reasonable basis for finding that Cornell is
entitled to the entire market value of Hewlett-Packard's CPU bricks
or servers or workstations as a reasonable royalty base," and that "the
hypothetical processor revenue of $8,061,545,086, not the
hypothetical CPU brick revenue [of $23,005,506,034], is the
108 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane).
109. See id. at 1549.
110. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 01-CV-1974, 2008 WL 2223197
(N.D.N.Y. May. 27, 2008) (pretrial opinion on the EMVR); Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co, 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (post trial opinion granting defendant's motion for
JMOL or, in the alternative, remittitur). The judgment is on appeal before the Federal Circuit
(No. 01-CV-1974).
111. Hewlett-Packard, 2008 WL 2223197 at *2.
112. Hewlett-Packard, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 286-87 (citations omitted).
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appropriate royalty base."" 3 Note, however, that although the court in
this case rejected application of the entire market value rule on the
facts-and although some of the dicta in Lucent might be read as
questioning the relevance of the rule altogether' l4 -in one subsequent
case the Federal Circuit has approved a lower court's use of a royalty
base that included not only the value of the infringing end products,
but also the value of certain unpatented disposable products linked to
the infringing products."'
From an economic perspective, the fundamental problem is that
the entire market value rule remains just as incoherent in the context
of reasonable royalties as it does in the context of lost profits. As I
argued above, the overarching consideration in awarding reasonable
royalties should be to replicate the bargain the parties would have
struck ex ante.116 The factors courts take into account in determining
whether to apply the rule to the calculation of royalties", bear little if
any relationship to this objective. A better policy would be simply to
inquire into whether the parties would have chosen a running royalty
ex ante, and if so to elicit expert testimony concerning the rate and
base they might have chosen. Parties sometimes do choose sales
revenue from sales of the end product as the royalty base, after all, as
a matter of convenience; in such a case, there is no particular reason
to avoid using such a base as long as it is accompanied by an
appropriate rate." 8 Where there is no reason to believe the parties
would have chosen such a base, however, courts should avoid doing
so as well. Thus in Cornell, there was no reason to believe that the
parties would have chosen sales of CPUs as the royalty base for a
license involving a single component of a processor." 9 Similarly, in
Lucent, there was no reason to believe that the parties would have
chosen sales of Microsoft Outlook as the royalty base for a date
113. Id. at 289, 292. Judge Rader reduced the base further to account for an implied license
with Intel, and thus awarded Cornell $53,494,282, using a final royalty base of $6,686,785,273
and a jury-determined royalty rate of 0.8 percent. Id. at 292.
114. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (rejecting application of the entire market value rule on the facts of the case, while also
noting that the rule was developed before the contemporary appreciation of the economics of
infringement damages).
115. See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
116. See supra Part II.B.
117. See supra text accompanying note 112.
118. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338-39; Einhom, supra note 101; see also Cotter, supra note
3, at 1186 & n.164 (citing additional sources for the proposition that firms may use the revenue
derived from sales of final products as the royalty base, as a matter of convenience).
119. See Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co, 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 289 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
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picker function that many Outlook users probably never used. 12 0 To
be sure, as the Federal Circuit itself noted in Lucent, there is a sense
in which the choice of royalty base can be seen as a minor issue; even
an enormous base, if multiplied by a correspondingly minute rate,
could still result in a royalty that approximates the value of the
invention at issue. 12 ' Nevertheless, the problem remains that lay juries
may find it difficult to accept the correspondingly minute rate that
would be appropriate to avoid overcompensation,122 or (as the court
recently noted in Uniloc) may be affected merely by hearing mention
of an enormous royalty base.123 To be sure, some difficulties in
getting the message across to a lay jury may simply be unavoidable in
a system that renders trial by jury a constitutional right. Courts
nonetheless should be aware of the risks entailed and, as a
consequence, should be vigilant in requiring proof that the patentee's
proposed royalty rate and base correspond to the types of rates and
bases the parties would have agreed to in ex ante, arms' length
transactions. As long as courts adhere to the appropriate touchstone of
approximating the bargain the parties themselves realistically can be
expected to have struck, there is no reason to adopt bright-line rules
either forbidding the use of end product sales as a royalty base or of
requiring its use in the presence of arbitrary, economically irrelevant
factors.
4. Realistic Factors That Nevertheless Should Be
Excluded
Notwithstanding Principle Four, however, for purposes of
calculating royalties courts should continue to exclude two real-world
considerations the use of which would lead to incorrect calculations in
court. First, courts should continue to exclude from consideration the
parties' ex ante probability estimates of patent validity, enforceability,
and infringement because (contrary to intuition) applying these
factors ex post would introduce a double discounting problem.
Standard analysis shows that not making this assumption at trial, after
the patentee has already borne the risk that the court would find the
patent invalid or not infringed, would in effect amount to double
120. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337-38.
121. See id. at 1338-39.
122. For example, if thousands of patents read on a particular end product, the appropriate
rate to multiply by the value of the end product might be something in the nature of 0.000001%.
See Hearing on the Evolving IP Marketplace-Remedies, Fed. Trade Comm'n, (2009), available
at http://htc-01.media.globix.net/COMPOO8760MODI/ftc_web/transcripts/021109_sessl.pdf.
123. See Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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discounting. 124 As the courts have correctly surmised, the trier of fact
should assume that, at the time of the hypothetical negotiations, the
patentee and the would-be user believed the patent to be valid and
infringed. 125
Second, courts also probably should continue to exclude
evidence of the parties' relative bargaining power, even though this
factor surely must have some bearing on the terms of actual licensing
agreements,12 6 because evidence of bargaining power is unlikely to be
susceptible to adequate empirical verification.12 7 The only case thus
far that has passed judgment on this issue therefore has, in my view,
resolved the matter correctly by excluding such evidence.' 28
124. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1183 n.156 (with a correction noted in brackets):
Kalos and Putnam use the following example to illustrate this point. Suppose
that, at the time of infringement, the defendant would have agreed to license the
patent for $1,000,000 discounted to reflect an 80% probability of validity and a
70% probability of infringement. Stephen Kalos & Jonathan D. Putnam, On the
Incomparability of "Comparable": An Economic Interpretation of "Infringer's
Royalties, " 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 4-5 (1997). Assuming that the latter two
probabilities are independent, the resulting license fee to which the parties would
have agreed would have been $560,000 (that is, $1,000,000 x 0.7 x 0.8). Id. The
patent owner's expected payoff prior to trial, however, also must be discounted to
reflect the uncertainty surrounding validity and infringement. Id. For example, if
the patent owner's pretrial estimation of the probabilities of validity and
infringement are the same as the estimated probabilities of these events at the
time of infringement, the patent owner's expected payoff is only 56% of her best
estimate of the damages she is likely to be awarded. Id. Thus, if she is entitled to
recover $1,000,000 in the event that she prevails at trial, and has a 56% chance of
prevailing at trial, she should be indifferent between licensing the patent ex [ante]
and recovering damages ex [post]. If instead she were entitled to recover only
$560,000 in the event she prevailed at trial, her expected payoff from litigating
would be only $313,600 ($560,000 x 0.7 x 0.8). Kalos & Putnam, supra, at 4-5.
She would, in other words, be worse off as a result of the infringement. Id.
125. See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325; Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 914,
917-18 (E.D. Tex. 2008), affd mem., 2010 WL 55625 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 2010) (citing Georgia-
Pacific Corp. v. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. (1970))); Sundance, Inc. v.
Demonte Fabricating, Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 2287829, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2007);
Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., No. 4:OOCV01915, 2005 WL 5989796, at *14-*15
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2005); Accuscan, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., No. 96 Civ. 2579 (HB), 1998 WL
603217, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1998) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 915 F.
Supp. 1333, 1352-1353 (D. Del. 1994)).
126. While I recognize that the licensor's bargaining power would be a factor influencing
real-world negotiations-and have sided with scholars arguing that, in theory, an optimal
royalty calculation should take this consideration into account, see Cotter, supra note 3, at 1182-
83-I have consistently expressed doubt that courts would consider this factor in awarding
reasonable royalty damages. See id at 1182 & n.154. See also Cotter, supra note 10, at 133.
127. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1182 (expressing doubt that courts could accurately
estimate the parties' relative bargaining power, or that any expert would be competent to testify
on this issue).
128. See Emptoris, 567 F. Supp. 2d 914.
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5. Other Factors That Should Be Excluded
Principle Four's emphasis on the application of real-world
variables also suggests various ways in which courts could improve
the law of patent damages by excluding some types of evidence that
have been considered in previous cases. I have already suggested
above, for example, that the Federal Circuit should overrule case law
permitting courts to estimate royalties based on unrealistic
assumptions such as the licensee's willingness to negotiate for a
license that would have left it with no expected profit from the use of
the patented invention. 129 I also argued that the court should do away
with the entire market value rule.130 A third reform, which the Federal
Circuit implemented just recently (in early January 2011),131 is to
discard so-called "rule of thumb" approaches that are inconsistent
with contemporary standards for the admissibility of expert
testimony.
As noted above, the term "rule of thumb" was sometimes used to
refer to the assumption that, in patent licensing transactions, the
licensee typically pays royalties equal to 25% of the profits derived
from the use of the patented invention.13 2 (The rule was sometimes
viewed as more in the nature of a "starting point" for negotiations
than a hard-and-fast rule, however.' 33 Moreover, if the reported
decisions are any guide, application of the rule of thumb appears to
have varied a bit from one case to another.134) As noted above, even
129. See supra notes 63, 74, 75 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
131. See Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
132. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853-56 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (referring to the 25-percent rule as assuming that "the inventor will keep 25% of the
profits from any infringing sales," and concluding that district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting expert testimony based in part on that the rule, which the expert characterized as
"'well-recognized' and 'widely used' by people in his field"), cert. granted, No. 10-290, 526
U.S. - (2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/ll2910zor.pdf;
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., Nos. 5:02-571, 5:04-84, 2007 WL
7083655, at *13-14 (D. Ky. May 12, 2007) (stating that "'the 25% rule or a close variant of it
has been recognized by a number of other federal courts as a 'rule of thumb' or 'typical' in the
licensing field') (quoting Standard Mfg. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 766 (1999)).
133. See Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 470 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432
n.38 (D. Del. 2007).
134. See, e.g., i4i, 589 F.3d at 1268-72 (describing expert's methodology as involving the
multiplication of the price of an allegedly comparable product by Microsoft's profit margin by
25%, with further adjustments in light of the Georgia-Pacific factors); Paice LLC v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 630 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (multiplying defendant's profit margin
by 25%, then further reducing the resulting percentage to take into account, inter alia,
defendant's lower margin on sales of hybrid vehicles); Cohesive Technologies, Inc. v. Waters
Corp., 526 F. Supp. 2d 84, 123 & nn.21 & 22 (D. Mass. 2007) (after concluding that the
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after Lucent the Federal Circuit in i4i held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony on damages,
which testimony was based in part on the witness's application of a
25% rule of thumb. 13 5
The problem with the 25% rule of thumb was that it often lacked
a sufficient basis to satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which
requires that expert opinions be supported by reliable methodology
and be tied to the specific facts of the case at issue.'3 6 As others
evidence did not support a finding of actual damages in the form of lost profits, and that plaintiff
was therefore entitled to a reasonable royalty, describing the 25% rule as "a rule of thumb for
calculating a hypothetical royalty rate, determined by taking 25% of [plaintiffs] gross profit
margin (revenues minus marginal costs divided by revenues) for the year of the infringement,"
on the assumption that the defendant's "gross profit margin would be similar," and the "book of
wisdom" approach as applied in this case as involving the calculation of a "royalty rate based
upon a 25% rule of the profits as hypothesized by but-for lost profits during the infringement
period"), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 543 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Standard Mfg., 42 Fed. Cl. at 766-67 (determining the base royalty rate by multiplying
the licensee's average profit rate on sales of end products by 25%); Ajinomoto Co. v. Archers-
Daniels-Midland Co., No. 95-218, 1998 WL 151411, at *52 n.46 (D. Del. Mar. 13, 1998) (after
describing determining the royalty base by multiplying the defendant's cost saving from the use
of the patented invention by 25%), aff'd, 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Interestingly, the court in Cohesive Technologies appears to have viewed the terms "25 percent
rule of thumb" and "book of wisdom" as synonyms. See Cohesive Technologies., 526 F. Supp.
2d at 123 n.22. More commonly, however, the term "book of wisdom," which appears to have
originated in Justice Brandeis's opinion in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process
Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933), is used to refer to a different concept, namely the practice of
calculating royalties based in part on events that occurred after the date of the hypothetical
negotiations. See, e.g., Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the reasonable royalty approach "permits and often requires a court
to look to events and facts that occurred thereafter and that could not have been known to or
predicted by the hypothesized negotiators," such as whether the patented invention will meet
with commercial success) (citing Sinclair, 289 U.S. at 698-99); see also Studiengesellschaft
Kohle GmbH v. Dart Indus., 862 F.2d 1564, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (similar); Honeywell Int'l
Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 459, 462-70 (D. Del. 2005) (following
Fromson, and distinguishing three post-Fromson cases, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod Co., 298 F.3d 1302
(Fed. Cir. 2002), and Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), in which the Federal Circuit arguably disfavored some uses of post-negotiation
information). But see TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating
that evidence of infringer's actual profits is admissible, but that correct focus is "the date when
the infringement began"); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed.
Cir. 1983) (stating that infringer's profit "is to be determined not on the basis of a hindsight
evaluation of what actually happened, but on the basis of what the parties to the hypothetical
license negotiations would have considered at the time of negotiations"). To the extent such ex
post developments are relevant to determining what the parties' expectations may have been ex
ante, the analysis presented above in Part II suggests that the evidence of such developments
sometimes may be helpful in reconstructing the terms of the hypothetical ex ante bargain. Courts
nevertheless should be wary of the risk of hindsight bias.
135. See i4i, 598 F.3d at 853-56.
136. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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previously had noted,'37 the 25% rule was largely derived from a
study conducted by Robert Goldscheider in the late 1950s of "the
Swiss subsidiary of a large American company, with 18 licensees
around the world, each having an exclusive territory."' 38 Moreover,
the licenses covered a range of intellectual property, not just
patents.139 It seems highly doubtful, to say the least, that such limited
support would shed any light on contemporary licensing practices
across a range of industries. In addition, although Goldscheider and
his coauthors argued that another, more recent study they conducted
confirms the general validity of a rule of thumb based on payments of
25% of operating profits,14 0  as Cox and Rusek pointed out in
response, the data on which this study was conducted was derived
from publicly traded companies only; did not take into account
137. See generally Alan Cox & Stephen Rusek, The Demise ofJunk Science and the 25%
Rule, LAw360, July 28, 2010, http://www.nera.com/67_6830.htm; William C. Rooklidge &
Martha K. Gooding, When Hypothetical Turns to Fantasy: The Patent Reasonable Royalty
Negotiation, BNA PAT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Sept. 28, 2010. For additional
critical commentary, see Bailey, supra note 18, at 6 (stating that "[tjhe 25% rule makes no
economic sense"); Roy J. Epstein & Alan J. Marcus, Economic Analysis of the Reasonable
Royalty: Simplification and Extension ofthe Georgia-Pacific Factors, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 555, 573 (2003) (arguing that "[t]he resulting royalties can be either excessive or
too small, depending on the underlying economics"); Amy Landers, Let the Games Begin:
Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy ofIntellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 307, 334 (2005) (stating that "[t]he rule of thumb fails to account for the parties' actual
individual risk-sharing, the risks assumed by both parties, and the resources contributed by
each"); Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Patent Damages: What Reforms are Still
Needed?, LANDSLIDE, May/June 2010, at 37-38 (referring to the "25 percent rule" as having "no
basis in economic reality"); Gregory K. Leonard & Lauren J. Stiroh, Economic Approaches to
Intellectual Property Policy, Litigation, and Management, in PATENT LITIGATION 2008, at 454-
55 (PLI Pat., Trademark, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 14977, 2008) (referring
to the 25 percent rule as "unambiguously unreasonable," "arbitrary"); Seaman, supra note 1, at
1696 (referring to the rule as having been "justly criticized for numerous reasons"); Richard S.
Toikka, Patent Licensing under Competitive and Non-Competitive Conditions, 82 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 279, 292-93 (2000). But see Jonathan E. Kemmerer & Jiaqing Lu,
Profitability and Royalty Rates Across Industries: Some Preliminary Evidence 2 (2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 141865 (concluding that "royalty rates across industries
do not converge with the rates generated by 25% rule at an industry level, although the reported
rates tend to fall between 25% of the gross profit margins and 25% of operating profit margins,"
but that "the 25% rule serves [as] a good starting point for royalty negotiations"); Matthew Sag
& Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J. L. SC. & TECH. 1, 26-27
(2007) (stating that "patent license fees are frequently determined by seemingly arbitrary rules
of thumb such as the '25 Percent Rule' or reference to past industry practices" and that "[e]ach
of these methods is something of a 'guesstimate,"' but that "it seems fair to assume that methods
of valuation that were not a function of the alleged infringer's potential profit would be
displaced in the market by those that were") (citations omitted).
138. Robert Goldscheider et al., Use of the 25 Per Cent Rule in Valuing IP, 37 LES
NOUVELLES 123, 123 (2002).
139. See id
140. See id at 132-33.
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differing license terms (e.g., exclusive versus nonexclusive, territorial,
type of IP, etc.) or the viability of noninfringing alternatives;
computed percentages using licensees' operating profits generally, not
by product; did not report a rate of error; and varies widely from one
industry to another. 141 To be fair, Goldscheider et al. argued only that
the rule "is best used as one pricing tool and should be considered in
conjunction with other (quantitative and qualitative) factors that can
and do affect royalty rates."l42 Even on these terms, however, it is
difficult to perceive the rule as serious economic analysis; as Cox and
Rusek note, Goldscheider et al.'s own mathematical example of the
rule in operation would result in royalties that would cost the licensee
the entire revenue enhancement or cost reduction resulting from the
use of the patented invention. 14 3 Given this context, the Federal
Circuit's affirmation of the application of the rule of thumb in i4i144
seemed doubly disappointing, coming as it did so soon after the
Lucent opinion seemed to herald a renewed emphasis on economic
realism in damages calculations. 145
Fortunately, the Federal Circuit has now rectified matters by
unequivocally holding in Uniloc that "[e]vidence relying on the 25%
rule of thumb is .. . inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to
the facts of the case at issue."146 One would hope that the decision in
Uniloc reflects a return to the economic rationality foreshadowed in
Lucent, and heralds a greater receptivity on the part of the court to
economically convincing arguments (even when those arguments go
against the grain of the court's own precedent). Given the nontrivial
risk that legislative intervention on the damages front could result in
making things worse, 14 7 the patent community may be forgiven for
breathing a collective sigh of relief at the court's recent efforts to fend
off such intervention by voluntarily reforming some of the practices it
had tolerated for so long.
141. See Cox & Rusek, supra note 137.
142. See Goldscheider et al., supra note 138, at 133.
143. See Cox & Rusek, supra note 137 (pointing out, in addition, that in the context of
Goldscheider et al.'s mathematical example an increase in revenue of $6 instead of S10 would
result in royalties exceeding the value of the invention to the licensee). For a response, see John
C. Jarosz et al., The 25% Rule Lives On, LAW360, Sept. 8, 2010,
http://ip.law360.com/web/articles/187507.
144. See i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853-56 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
145. See Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
146. Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
147. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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III. CONCLUSION
I have argued above that a rational system of patent damages
would take into account four related principles in awarding
reasonable royalties: (1) for purposes of awarding retrospective
damages, courts should take the scope of substantive patent law as
fixed; (2) the baseline damages recovery for prevailing patent owners
should be the amount that restores them to the position they would
have enjoyed, but for the infringement; (3) courts should depart from
this baseline when doing so is necessary to attain optimal deterrence;
and (4) in attempting to replicate the license the parties would have
negotiated ex ante but for the infringement, courts generally should
authorize the consideration of factors that the parties realistically
would have used, and should exclude consideration of factors that
lack a sound basis.
None of these principles constitutes a radical departure from
existing law, and the Federal Circuit probably could accomplish the
necessary remaining changes without the need for additional
legislation.148 Indeed, the reforms I have advocated build upon
evolving case law as exemplified in the Federal Circuit's Lucent and,
more recently, Uniloc decisions. The express adoption of these
principles, nevertheless, would mark a transition in patent
jurisprudence, towards explicit judicial recognition of patent law as
nothing more (or less) than a type of economic regulation. According
exclusive rights in inventions, in other words, is a means to an end or
ends (encouraging investment in invention, disclosure, innovation,
and so on),14 9 and not as an end in itself. Similarly, damages in the
form of lost profits or reasonable royalties are best viewed as a means
to preserve the utilitarian structure upon which patent rights are
premised.
From this perspective, courts should employ the best
methodology reasonably available for carrying out this utilitarian
mandate; and for better or worse, for now that methodology consists
mostly of insights drawn from empirical and theoretical economics.
Seen in this light, damages analyses that are premised on
unsupportable assumptions (such as the licensee's willingness to
bargain for a license that would have left it with no profit from the use
148. For example, to the extent the Georgia-Pacific factors are likely to remain good law
for the foreseeable future, Durie and Lemley's suggestions for the structured use of these factors
seems fully consistent with the analysis presented in this article. See generally Durie & Lemley,
supra note 13.
149. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 126; Golden, supra note 50, at 509-11, 520-21.
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of the invention),150 that are based on an outmoded understanding of
the economic consequences of patent-driven market power (such as
the entire market value),' 5 ' or that defy mathematical logic (like some
applications of the now defunct 25% rule of thumb),15 2 should have
no place in contemporary patent jurisprudence. Like antitrust law
before the Chicago and post-Chicago School revolutions,153 the law
of patent damages has yet to fully mature in terms of its economic
sophistication. Fortunately for patent lawyers, courts, and scholars,
incorporating a few more insights from economic analysis should not
be terribly burdensome; unlike the subject matter of some patents,
most of the relevant insights are not exactly rocket science.
To be sure, some may argue that the factors this article urges
courts to focus upon-such as the value of the patent in comparison
with the next-best alternative, the use of economically comparable
licenses, and the use of realistic royalty rates and bases-are in many
instances likely to be difficult to quantify with any degree of
precision. Such criticism may not be entirely off the mark; there likely
will be difficulties in abandoning the faux precision of the entire
market value rule or rules of thumb for the type of analysis this article
advances. In response, however, I offer four concluding observations.
First, just because something is difficult does not mean that it is not
worth doing. To the extent the governing legal standards provide
incentives for repeat players to develop better databases on
comparable licenses, for experts to develop specialties in identifying
and quantifying next-best alternatives, and for lawyers to develop
methods for teaching juries to understand the relationship between
royalty rates and bases, I remain reasonably confident that the market
for the necessary information will evolve. Second, perhaps there are
better ways of quantifying patent value (as an input into the terms of
the hypothetical license) than the methods I have identified herein.
Without endorsing any specific analysis, I note only that economists
have presented various alternatives in recent years that may merit
further examination than they have received thus far.' 5 4 Third, the
150. See supra notes 63, 74, 75 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160
(2007) (noting, and celebrating, that "[s]ince the Chicago School revolution in the 1970s, federal
antitrust enforcement has become considerably less democratic and more technocratic").
154. See, e.g., F. Russell Denton, Rolling Equilibriums at the Pre-Commons Frontier:
Identifying Patently Efficient Royalties for Complex Products, 14 VA. J. L. & TECH. 48 (2009);
F. Russell Denton & Paul J. Heald, Random Walks, Non-Cooperative Games, and the Complex
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difficulty of quantifying damages is itself a factor that may weigh in
favor of injunctive relief, 155 and an award of injunctive relief surely
takes some of the sting out of not obtaining a large damages award.
Fourth, the fact that patent law, unlike copyright and trademark,16
lacks a provision permitting courts to award statutory damages in lieu
of proof of actual harm should not entitle courts to indulge
speculative theories that fail governing standards for the admissibility
of scientific and technical evidence. Indeed, it is particularly difficult
to justify a policy in favor of admitting speculative damages evidence
when there is no proof of intentional copying (as there often is not).157
Inadvertent infringement means that the defendant independently
invented; and while patent law does not recognize independent
invention as a defense, there is surely no compelling need to depart
from rational standards of proof and award speculative damages in
such a case either, given that (by hypothesis) the patent incentive was
largely unnecessary to the creation of the invention under
consideration. 158
I conclude by noting that the progress of the useful arts to which
patent law is supposed to be ancillary1 5 9 critically depends upon
scientific norms of rational, skeptical inquiry. 1o By contrast, there
have been times when patent norms (in particular, some aspects of the
law of patent damages) have seemed to be based more on the sort of
Mathematics of Patent Pricing, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175 (2003); Epstein, supra note 137;
Ravi Mohan, Analysis of the Entire Market Value Rule in Complex Technology
Litigation: Arduous Royalty Base Determinations, Unjust Damage Rewards, and Empirical
Approaches to Measuring Consumer Demand, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
639, 663-65 (2011), available at
http://www.chtlj.org/sites/default/files/media/articles/v027/v027.i3.Mohan_.pdf Mariko
Sakakibara, An Empirical Analysis ofPricing in Patent Licensing Contracts (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 515163.
155. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (stating that "[a]
plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction").
156. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006) (providing for statutory damages for copyright
infringement); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) (2006) (providing for statutory damages for trademark
counterfeiting). For discussion, see Thomas F. Cotter, Optimal Fines for False Patent Marking,
17 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REv. 181, 182 (2010).
157. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 72.
158. Of course, the patent incentive may have encouraged the patentee to invent earlier, to
have disclosed, etc.
159. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
160. Some postmodem scholars of science may disagree, but this is neither the time nor
the place to get into that debate.
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unsustainable assumptions that I have referred to elsewhere as "folk
economics."1 6 1 If nothing else, I hope that the reader takes away from
this article the idea that patent law occasionally might benefit from a
larger dose of both rationality and skepticism-especially when it
comes to determining entitlements to patent damages.
161. See Cotter, supra note 3, at 1155-56, 1179 n.137.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 761 2010-2011
* *
HeinOnline  -- 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 762 2010-2011
